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THE POLITICS OF INCIVILITY
Bernard E. Harcourt*

The Flemish painter, Pieter Bruegel, portrayed in his artwork men relieving
themselves, cripples begging, and peasants toiling-as well as butchery and the
gallows. In his masterful work, The Civilizing Process, NorbertElias showed how
the "late medieval upper class" had not yet demanded, as later generations would,
that "everything vulgar should be suppressed from life and therefore from
pictures."
For centuries now, defining incivility has been intimately connected with social
rank, class status, political hierarchy, and relations of power. The ability to
identify and sanction incivility has been associated with positions of political
privilege-and simultaneously has constituted and reinforced political power.
This, Ifear, remains true today: Defining incivility in politicaldiscourse continues
to be apoliticalstrategy that is deeply embedded in relations ofpower.
In the aftermath of the Tucson shootings, there have been renewed calls for
greater civility in our politicaldiscourse. Although at a personal level I favor civil
discourse as the wiser path in politics, I recognize that it is inevitably a political
strategy that comes more easily to those who already have an audience or a
professionalposition that affords them greater access to the media and the public.
This suggests, at least to me, that we should be cautious about telling others how
civilly they should speak.

*
Julius Kreeger Professor of Law, and Professor and Chairman of the Political
Science Department, The University of Chicago. I am deeply grateful to the editors of the
Arizona Law Review for organizing such a stimulating symposium and to many marvelous
colleagues, especially Toni Massaro, Suzanne Dovi, Houston Smit, Julia Annas, David
Owen, Richard Brooks, Marc Miller, Barak Orbach, Margaret Jane Radin, Robin Stryker,
Kenji Yoshino, and other participants at the Symposium, for discussion and comments on
this Essay. Special thanks to Gabriel Mathless for excellent research assistance and helpful
comments.
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Middle French civilitd (Frenchcivilitd) organized community or its
institutions, political organization or system or conception of this
(cl370), polite behaviour (1409; c1640 denoting an instance of this)
and its etymon classical Latin civilitdt-, cTvTlitas art of civil
government, politics (after ancient Greek XoAIrmKuPOLITIC n.),
behaviour as an ordinary person, unassumingness, in post-classical
Latin also citizenship . . . .
-Etymology

of civility, Oxford English Dictionary'

INTRODUCTION
In his Nouveau traitI de la civilit [New Treatise on Civility] originally

published in 1671, Antoine de Courtin counseled his reader to be particularly
attentive to their relations with those of inferior social rank. Persons of a superior
rank "must at a minimum, for their own self-interest, be good to their domestics,
and civil and honest to those who are not their dependents," de Courtin advised.2

1.

See Civility Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/

view/Entry/33581?redirectedFrom=civility

(last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (etymology and

definitions 1, 2, and 3).
2.
ANTOINE DE COURTIN, NOUVEAU TRAITE DE LA CIVILITE QUI SE PRATIQUE EN
FRANCE PARMI LES HONNETES GENS [NEW TREATISE ON CIVILITY AS PRACTICED IN FRANCE
AMONG THE HONNETES GENS] 191 (Presses Universit6 de Saint-Etienne 1998) (1671). This is
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"What a monster it is, in effect, to be a grandseigneur that has no civility."3 In the
following chapter, de Courtin addressed civility among equals. Ordinarily, de
Courtin remarked, conversation among equals "is more free and more gay.'A But
precisely for that reason, de Courtin thought it was important to observe certain
rules of honesty; pleasantries among equals, especially when spirited and jocular,
demand special attention so as not to offend. In his treatise, de Courtin sketched
out a few guidelines. First, never take aim at a person of one's equal or anyone
recently deceased. Second, be careful to distinguish between voluntary and
involuntary defects. "It is a very mean quip indeed to mock someone because they
are one-eyed or lame, since it is not their fault," de Courtin advised.5 Third, be sure
to distinguish between the interior and exterior of the person. "A man will not take
offense if you tell him that he is not looking well, but he will get very angry if you
tell him that he does not have much wit." 6 And so on. There is a place for
pleasantries among equals, de Courtin wrote, but within reason. And not, of
course, in one's relations with those of superior social standing "before whom one
must evince one's submission by means of studied comportments."
Social rank and relations of power have been deeply imbricated with
norms of civil discourse and conduct for centuries now-perhaps since the dawn
of civilization. In his masterful volumes on The Civilizing Process, originally
published in 1939, Norbert Elias traced the transformation of the term civility from
its origins rooted in notions of citizenship, political activity, and civil organization,
to the realm of manners and politeness, or what had previously been called
courtesy. Elias painstakingly unearthed the deep interconnection between the
evolution of manners and social hierarchies-class rank, social status, political
standing, and cultural distinction.9 In a complementary work, A Genealogy of
Manners, Jorge Arditi shows the later reconfiguration of the notion of civility with
0
the emergence of the word etiquette in the English language.'
Each of these transformations would reflect and be shaped by changing
social relations, new ways of being, shifting relations of power, and new

a reproduction of the edition of the treatise published in 1728 after the death of the author.
This translation is my own.
3.
Id
4.

Id. at 193.

5.

Id. at 196.

6.
7.

Id.
Id. at 192.

8.
NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS, AND
STATE FORMATION AND CIVILIZATION (Edmund Jephcott trans., Wiley-Blackwell 1994)
(1939). See generally 1-4 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE (Philippe Aries & Georges Duby
eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1991); STEPHEN MENNELL, NORBERT ELIAS: CIVILIZATION AND
THE HUMAN SELF-IMAGE (1989).
See, e.g., ELIAS, supra note 8, at 16-19, 59-63 (discussing the history of
9.
manners in relation to class distinctions).
JORGE ARDITI, A GENEALOGY OF MANNERS: TRANSFORMATIONS OF SOCIAL
10.
RELATIONS IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND FROM THE FOURTEENTH TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
1-17 (1998).
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organizational and institutional arrangements." As Arditi writes, referring to Elias,
each shift would mark "the coming of a new order of social relations, and of a
transformed person[,] ... a growing separation of bodies and psyches out of which
2
emerged, two hundred years later, the modem, 'civilized' individual." Even
more, each of the transformations would reconstitute the political sphere. They
would mark "the formation of a new matrix of social practices that both enable and
shape the rise of the modem state."' 3
A. The Politics ofIncivility
Political discourse is embedded in relations of power: It is permeated
through and through, and simultaneously constitutive of power relations-in a
constantly fluid and reiterative process. Power relations shape, and are themselves
affected by political discourse. The capacity, for instance, to call a member of a
social movement "a terrorist" or "a freedom fighter"-and to get away with it or
not-is tied in complex ways to one's position in the political sphere. Whether
someone is heard, applauded, ridiculed, ignored, or excluded is a reflection of the
political influence of the person speaking and at the same time affects the political
standing of that speaker. What one is able to say, to get away with, and to repeat is
not only a measure of the speaker's political clout, but also affects that speaker's
station in complex social relations and in politics.
By the same token, the ability to brand a particular discourse as uncivil is
itself a political accomplishment that reflects a certain position of privilege. The
faculty to define certain speech as uncivil, to castigate a speaker, to call for, urge,
or demand civil discourse-and to get away with it-is intimately connected to
one's place in the political realm. It is also, unquestionably, a political stratagem.
Those who call for more civil discourse-just like those who do not respond in
kind to incivilities, who remain above the fray, who take the high road-are
themselves engaged in a discursive tactic. It is not, in any sense, neutral or
apolitical. It may well be a smarter political strategy-smarter, I believe, because it
reflects and projects (simultaneously reinforcing the perception and through
perceptions, the reality of) political strength and power. But let us not be mistaken:
It is a political strategy.
Calling out incivilities and urging greater civility in political discourse are
arrows in the quiver of the political arts. Although they are presented as neutral,
they are not. They represent, instead, a way to seize the political high-ground. As
such, they often redound to the benefit of those who are in stronger political
positions. Often, they serve the interests of the more dominant or mainstream
political voices. The fact is, certain speakers in the public sphere are at greater ease
to be civil. They may already have an audience that is listening, or a professional
position that affords them more access to the media and to the larger public.
Others, less well-situated, may feel a more urgent need to go to extremes to attract
attention. Still others may feel anger at being on the margins of the political debate
11.
12.
13.

See id. at 4.
Id.
Id.

2012]1

THE POLITICS OF INCIVILITY

349

and turn to uncivil rhetoric to get their voice heard-rightly or wrongly. In many
cases, it may redound to their detriment, perhaps because their social position
already threatens to minimize or distort their speech. There tend to be sharp
differences in the reception of linguistic expression based on gender, racial, and
ethnic differences among speakers. Some speakers, it turns out, can ill afford to be
uncivil-and yet may choose to, deliberately and after deep reflection.
All this suggests that there is a complex politics surrounding incivility in
political discourse-surrounding the naming and identifying, the use and
avoidance, the criticism and defense of uncivil speech. There is, in other words, a
politics of incivility. And in this politics, it is important to tread carefully so as not
to inadvertently empower those who can already and more easily afford to be civil.
B. The Incivility of Politics
The problem in the debate over civil discourse traces back to the slippage
in the use of the term civility. In its earliest sense, the word civility was coextensive
with the "art of civil government," with "orderliness in a state or region," with the
"absence of anarchy and disorder," with "citizenship," and "government"-more
simply, it was coextensive with "politics."' 4 Civility meant the internal ordering of
a polis, and in that sense, civility itself was just as "civil" as politics. In a curious
way, "civil war" marked the outer bounds of civility.'
In its more common usage today, civility qualifies politics. It is a kind of
politics, a type of political discourse that does not harm, injure, or offend fellow
citizens. The usage here connotes discourse or behavior "appropriate to civil
interactions; politeness, courtesy, consideration." 6 (Incidentally, in this sense,
civility in political discourse is no longer limited to civil government. One can
speak of a head of state demanding civility in their relations with allies or even
with enemies.)
The slippage between the two connotations of civility-as politics writ
large versus as a kind of acceptable politics-has affected our conception of
politics itself. It has fostered a liberal understanding of politics as an art of
governing that is civil and benefits citizens. It has promoted the idea that we are all
better off by being part of the political community, especially a political
community marked by order, domestic peace, and tranquility.
That conception of politics may have made sense in an earlier time, when
our ancestors were imagining commonwealths and civil societies and writing about
the brutish state of nature. But it is somehow hollow today. In the contemporary

14.
See Civility Definition, supra note 1 (etymology and definitions 1, 2, and 3).
The expression "civil war," naturally, differentiates domestic conflict
15.
internal to the state from war between states. This explains why many Southerners referred,
and still today refer, to the American Civil War as "the war between the states."
16.
Civility Definition, supra note I (definition 12.a). For this definition, the
Oxford English Dictionaryrefers the reader to the New York Review of Books from August
1991, where it is written, "Nixon often mistook civility for weakness, as one sees in his
taped references to loyal followers as 'candy asses."' Id.
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United States, we are born into civil society. The relevant political question is not
whether the political ordering benefits everyone as compared to a state of nature.
The relevant question is how political structures distribute resources and welfare
among citizens. And in this political competition, the outcomes themselves are by
no means "civil"-if by civil, again, we mean that they do not harm, injure, or
prejudice members of our shared community.
Politics today, paradoxically, is not a "civil" activity-or no longer,
assuming it ever was-but an agonistic field fraught with conflict, negotiation, and
compromise. At its core, politics favors some to the detriment of others. There is
no possible way to maintain our colossal political system-involving tax and
transfer, education and social welfare, domestic security and national defensewithout implicating sacrifice by some for the benefit of others. It is entirely
unrealistic to imagine that politics would involve only what we could call Paretooptimal political outcomes-outcomes that benefit one group of citizens without
setting anyone back in any way. It is not even clear that the concept of Pareto
optimality functions in the political domain, given that it is one's relative position
in society-one's relative social rank and welfare-that defines political wellbeing.
We are today born into the polis, and contemporary politics is
contestation over relative status, wealth, social rank, and well-being, over
opportunities and resources, education, jobs, and so on. It is a struggle within
complex relations of power. In that competition, in that struggle, some fare better,
others less well. President John F. Kennedy's famous line was noble: "[A]sk not
what your country can do for you-ask what you can do for your country."" But it
also betrayed what we all know, namely that some sacrifice more than others, and
some others benefit more than the rest. In that process, relations of power are
determinative. Social rank, cultural status, and political stature will have
significant effects. Whether to leverage and empower those effects, or instead to
try to limit them, is a political choice-a choice that is deeply connected to the
debates over civility in political discourse.
In these debates, I personally favor the civil path with respect to my own
political discourse. But I recognize full well that this represents a deliberate
political strategy. It is also, often, a form of self-protection. I have never regretted
being civil. Telling truth, as I see it, straight and honestly, with as little venom as
humanly possible is, in my opinion, the wiser path. It is, however, a privileged
path, and part of that privilege, I believe, entails not telling others how they should
talk. Let me not get ahead of myself, though, and turn first to more recent
American history.

President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961) (transcript
17.
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th century/kennedy.asp).

2012]

THE POLITICS OF INCIVILITY

351

I. A MORE RECENT AMERICAN HISTORY
A. The Tucson Shootings and Sarah Palin's Facebook
The issue of civil discourse in American political life has received
increased attention, especially since the mass shootings that took place in January
2011 in Tucson, Arizona. The tragic incident left six people dead and nearly took
the life of Representative Gabrielle Giffords.18 The issue of civility in discourse
arose, in large part, because of this particular image-a map from Sarah Palin's
Facebook page in March 2010 featuring 20 gun sights aimed at the 20 Democratic
districts that Palin's PAC planned to target:
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The Tucson Shooting, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/
18.
0,28757,2041535,00.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
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As the Huffington Post reported, Palin's rhetoric accompanying the map
was "decidedly militant." 9 Palin wrote on her Facebook page: "We'll aim for
these races and many others. . . . This is just the first salvo in afight to elect people
across the nation who will bring common sense to Washington. Please go to
sarahpac.com and join me in the fight."20 Many asked whether the pitch of

political discourse contributed to the shootings. The Washington Post posed the
question in the title of a lead story, Gabrielle Giffords Shooting in Tucson: Did It
2
Stem from State ofPoliticalDiscourse? 1

Few informed people answer that question in the affirmative. Proving
causation is a high burden, and it would be difficult to establish that political
rhetoric caused the mass shooting in Tucson. The National Institute for Civil
Discourse ("NICD") at the University of Arizona, a research-based organization at
the forefront of the debates, does not take the position that uncivil political
discourse causes political violence or caused the Tucson shootings. Instead, Dr.
Brint Milward, the Director of the NICD, argues that incivility discourages good
people from going into politics and makes it harder to get decent people to
govern. 22 That is a far cry from arguing that it causes political violence. For good
reason. The fact is, there is no good evidence to support a causal relation.
There is extensive research in the analogous context of the brokenwindows theory-the theory that incivilities such as minor social disorder (e.g.,
loitering, public drinking, panhandling, and prostitution) and minor physical
disorder (e.g., litter, graffiti, and abandoned buildings), if tolerated in a
neighborhood, produce an environment that is likely to cause serious crime.23 That
research conclusively establishes that there is no reliable evidence of a causal
link.24 By contrast, there is not even reliable research on the connection between
uncivil discourse and political violence. At least, I have found none. For now, it is
19.

Jeff Muskus, Sarah Palin's PAC Puts Gun Sights on Democrats She's

Targeting in 2010, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2011, 11:56 AM), http://www.huffington

post.com/2010/03/24/sarah-palins-pac-puts-gunn_5 11433.html.
Id. (emphasis added).
Sandhya Somashekhar, Gabrielle Giffords Shooting in Tucson: Did It Stem
from State of Political Discourse?, WASH. POsT (Jan. 9, 2011, 12:38 AM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/08/AR2011010803652.html.
Brint Milward, Director, Nat'l Inst. for Civil Discourse, Address at the
22.
Arizona Law Review Symposium: Political Discourse, Civility, and Harm (Jan. 14, 2012).
See, e.g., James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The
23.
Police andNeighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 38 (arguing that a
correlation exists between law enforcement's failure to control certain types of "quality of
life" crimes, such as loitering, public drunkenness, and vandalism, and the increased
likelihood that violent crimes, such as robbery, will occur).
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF
24.
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 88-89 (2001); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and
Broken Windows: Terry, Race, andDisorderin New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457,
461-62 (2000); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from
New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 271, 315-16 (2006);
Adam M. Samaha, Regulationfor the Sake ofAppearance, 125 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming
2012).
20.
21.
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fair to assume that the level of incivility of political discourse, in all likelihood,
does not cause political turmoil.
B. Republican and Democratic Party Polarization
Now, in the analogous context of the broken-windows theory, there is
evidence that supports another hypothesis, namely that both minor disorder and
serious crime may have common antecedents. In the most thorough research,
Robert Sampson and Stephen Raudenbush trace the common antecedent to a
notion of what they call "collective efficacy"-a form of trust in a neighborhood.25
They find that both incivilities and neighborhood crime are likely to increase when
there is lower trust among residents in the neighborhood.
By analogy, we might ask whether political incivility and political
violence have similar antecedent conditions-and, if I had to venture a hypothesis,
I would propose polarized politics. The suggestion would be that as political
opinions and positions become more extreme and polarized, the level of discourse
might get elevated, as well as, possibly, political violence. This is akin to Cass
Sunstein's hypothesis, discussed in Going to Extremes and Republic.com 2.0, that,

when people find themselves in like-minded groups, they move to extremes and
that, as people become more extreme in their political views, it increases the risk
26
of contempt for others and possibly violence. Much of this work remains
normative and anecdotal-but it does bear similarity to the analogous situation of
neighborhood trust, for which there is empirical evidence.
There is some evidence that political opinion has become more polarized
in this country since the 1970s, especially among political elites. Professor Richard
Pildes at New York University has marshaled some relevant data, as have
Professors Toni Massaro and Robin Stryker at the University of Arizona. 27 The
increased polarization is most evident among political party leaders. According to
Pildes, "The parties have become purer distillations of themselves. They are
internally more unified and coherent, and externally more distant from each other,
See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social
25.
Observation ofPublic Spaces: A New Look at Disorderin Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM.
J. Soc. 603, 637-39 (1999) (arguing that due to shared theoretical features, both public
disorder and predatory crimes are explained by a concentration of disadvantage and lowered
collective efficacy); see also Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A
Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 923 (1997) (offering evidence that

the social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf
of the common good acts as "a robust predictor of lower rates of violence").
26.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: How LIKE MINDS UNITE AND
DIVIDE 3-5 (2009); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 10-11 (2007).

27.
Toni M. Massaro & Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy,
and Emerging Evidence on Civility and Effective DemocraticEngagement,54 ARIZ. L. REV.
375, 412 (2012); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011); see also ROBIN
STRYKER,

NAT'L

INST.

FOR CIVIL

DISCOURSE,

RESEARCH

BRIEF

NO.

6, POLITICAL

POLARIZATION (2011), available at http://www.nicd.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/research
briefs/NICD research brief6.pdf
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than anytime over the last one hundred years." 28 Massaro and Stryker similarly
find that "today's elite party polarization is much higher than it was 40 years ago,
with the 1970s standing out as one of the most bipartisan eras in American
history."29 There is substantial empirical evidence to support this: "In 1976,
moderates constituted 30% of the House; by 2002, this proportion had shrunk to
8%. Similarly, in 1970, moderates constituted 41% of the Senate; today, that
proportion is 5%."3o Pildes adds that, "over this same period 'strong conservatives'
grew from 17% of House Republicans to 67%, while 'strong liberals' went from
35% of House Democrats to more than 50%.",31
There is some debate as to whether this elite phenomenon has affected
polarization within the general public. Pildes marshals evidence in support, noting
that "one study concludes that only 13% of voters in the 2004 presidential election
were 'swing voters,' compared to an average of 23% in presidential elections from
1972-2004.",32 Pildes adds, "Split-ticket voting has declined sharply: more voters
express consistent, partisan political preferences by voting for candidates from the
same party across all races, whether for the House, the Senate, or the
presidency." 3 Massaro and Stryker caution, though, that although research finds
"that mass polarization with respect to political party identification has increased

since the early 1970s," this does not necessarily imply that "the nation is beset by
more general societal 'culture wars."' 34 It is unclear to what extent polarization
among the political elite has seeped into the public imagination. There is some
anecdotal evidence, although, that this may be the case.

28.

Pildes, supra note 27, at 277.

29.

Massaro & Stryker, supra note 27, at 412 (relying primarily on Marc J.

Hetherington, Review Article: Putting Polarization into Perspective, 39 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
413 (2009), and Geoffrey C. Layman et al., Party Polarization in American Politics:
Characteristics,Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN. REv. POL. Sci. 83, 85-86 (2006)).
Pildes, supra note 27, at 277 (footnote omitted) (citing ALAN I.
30.
ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS,
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 139, 141 (2010); Alan Abramowitz, U.S.

POLARIZATION,

AND

Senate Elections in a

available at
manuscript),
(unpublished
24,
2009)
(Oct.
Era
Polarized
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/archived/Bicameralism%20papers/abromowitz3.pdf).
Id. at 277 n.4 (citing ABRAMOWITZ,supra note 30, at 142).
31.
Id. at 277 n.7 (citing THE SWING VOTER IN AMERICAN POLITICS 138 (William
32.
G. Mayer ed., 2008)).
33.
Id. at 278 (citing Larry M. Bartels, Partisanshipand Voting Behavior, 19521996, 44 AM. J. POL. ScI. 35 (2000)); Marc J. Hetherington, Resurgent Mass Partisanship:
The Role of Elite Polarization,95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 619, 629 (2001)).
Massaro & Stryker, supra note 27, at 412-13. They note there that, "From
34.
1972-2002, within the American electorate there was convergence in issue opinions by age,
education, race, religion, and region, suggesting at the very least that the culture wars trope
is exaggerated." Id. at 413; see also Claude S. Fischer & Greggor Mattson, Is America
Fragmenting?, 35 ANN. REV. Soc. 435, 435 (2009) (reviewing "claims that between 1970
and 2005 American society fragmented along lines of cultural politics, social class,
immigration, race, or lifestyle" and finding "little evidence for increasing fragmentation of
America along lines of race, ethnicity, or immigration status").

2012]

THE POLITICS OF INCIVILITY

355

C. Anecdotal Evidence from the Tea Party and the Occupy Movement
Anecdotally, it does seem that the Tea Party and the Occupy Wall Street
movement reflect greater polarization of American politics. They represent two
new extremes on the political spectrum-and they seem to have elongated that
spectrum. Interestingly and revealingly, their language tends to be, at times,
uncivil. Tea Party communications tend to refer to war and enemies-to
revolution, to combat, and to armed struggle. A good illustration is the typical
newsletter from a Tea Party website, TeaParty.org. Notice the blood-dripping
script, the way "Amerika" is spelled, the hammer and sickle. Notice the direct
reference to a "war chest." These are all direct references to the American
Revolution, the Cold War, and the need for violent revolutionary or civil war-the
very antithesis to civil discourse:

bl(i (

VtPIMU1fT - LiTTLt rtODPLt

Regulating U.S. into Economic Destruction
"Willthe governments insatiable lustto control the environment, currency, economy and society crushindividual
rights, thereby forcing Patriotsinto the Obama-Collective?" StevsEichler- TeaParty.Org
Inaccordance withthelaw,the Executive
Branch
must document
annually
thenumberofnewregulatory
actions
it plans forthe
agenda
has4,257 new regulatoryactions.At least219willhavean
comingyear.TheAdministration's
currentregulatory
economic impactof$100 rillion ormore.Thatis anincrease ofnearly15percent
wer last yearwhenit had191.
significant
regulations
willhavean
statingthatsomeoftheseneweconomically
Americans haveheardtheAdministration
economic impactoftensofbillionsofdollars.

TIMETO BUILD THE TEA PARTY 'WAR CHEST
Tea Party Must Stop The Obama Regime!

ONETIMEDONATION

Lower down on the page, the Tea Party writes: "In times of peace,
prepare for war!" The iconography is also entirely revolutionary:
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IN TIMESOF PEACE, PREPARE FOR WARI

FORWARD TO AFRIUND

TIMETO BUILD THERANKS!

It Is Now Time To Help America

mootviah higr-joes dcilion
Your 99centswI pwer Ii TeaPartynakingitpossibletotteam to traiel toWashington
makesanddothatjobthatnItionsof TeaPartiers carntdo 59 cents perdayt

America NeedsThe29 11program
nowl

Don't Just Sit There - Get Involved!
§

RSSlood - R..O

855

reader View R$S)
TooPoty updates through yout fonriate

Ernailupdotes - ReceiNe TeaPastynews and alertsby email (Signup)

TEA PARTY MUST UNITE & MOBILIZE
www.UniTEAMobile.com

At the other end of the political spectrum, the Occupy Wall Street
movement expressly embraces nonviolence (and for the most part has been
nonviolent35 ), but the protesters often display posters that could easily be
interpreted as uncivil-or at least, that contain a lot of language that would have to
be redacted from newspapers. (When I tried to have these photos published with an
editorial in the New York Times, I was simply told "no way.") Some of the posters
read as follows:

35.

See Bernard Harcourt, Outlawing Dissent: Rahm Emanuel's New Regime,

(Jan. 19, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerical
2012/jan/19/outlawing-dissent-rahm-emanuel-new-regime; OCCUPY WALL STREET, http:/I
occupywallst.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
GUARDIAN
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Photo by Mia Ruyter
Notice a feature that characterizes many of these Occupy posters: the use
of humor. In contrast to other contemporary social movements, the Occupy
protesters often add humorous twists to their interventions-though the rhetoric
remains nonpublishable. This poster reflects this well:

Photo by Mia Ruyter
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D. Presidential Politics and the "Santorum"Google Episode
The Tea Party and the Occupy movement, however, are by no means the
only ones who are, at times, "uncivil" (at least by some definitions). Republican
presidential candidate Rick Santorum has often been accused of incivility. At one
point during tense political debates, then Senator Santorum compared Tom
Daschle, the then Democratic Senate leader, to a "rabid dog."36 Santorum was also
"one of a group of Republican senators who in 2002 called a press conference
featuring a pack of bloodhounds to 'sniff out' any legislation that the Democratic
majority had produced." 37 His rhetoric often triggered backlash. As the New York
Times reports:

The late Senator Robert C. Byrd, a West Virginia Democrat and one
of the most devout traditionalists in the chamber, was appalled by
Mr. Santorum. After [Senator Santorum] accused Mr. Clinton of
speaking "bald-faced untruths," Mr. Byrd delivered a blistering
speech in which he derided his colleague's "insolence" and "rude
language" and suggested that Mr. Santorum might be better-suited
to "an alehouse or beer tavern." He lamented that he had lived long
enough "to see Pygmies stride like colossuses" in the august
chamber.
Mr. Santorum's antics in the budget debate inspired Senator
Bob Kerrey, Democrat of Nebraska, to make a semifamous remark
that "santorum" was in fact a Latin word for an anatomical
vulgarity. Mr. Santorum complained, and Mr. Kerrey clarified his
remark.
"I said that in fact 'santorum' might not be the actual word in
Latin," Mr. Kerrey explained in an interview. "But that he was
behaving like that word."
As Professor Kenji Yoshino suggests, incivility is often a tit-for-tat
game-or at least, it is often justified as a legitimate response to someone else's
initial incivility. 39 Rick Santorum is again a good example here-quite the pugilist
when it comes to political discourse. Santorum gives a lot, but receives a lot as
well. Santorum famously compared same-sex marriage to polygamy, only recently
telling a group of College Republicans in Concord, New Hampshire, "So anyone
can marry anyone else? . . . So anybody can marry several people?" 40
As payback for some of his more outlandish comments, if you Google the
word "Santorum," one of the first things that pops up (and for several months in
36.
Mark Leibovich, The Santorum of 2012 Comes from a Long History of
PoliticalBrawling, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 7, 2012, at A14.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
39.
Kenji Yoshino, The "Civil" Courts: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 54
ARIz. L. REv. 469,472 (2012).
40.
Leibovich, supra note 36.
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2011, the very first entry) is a made-up definition of the word "Santorum,"
courtesy of the gay-rights activist Dan Savage. If you click on that Googleprovided site, you will come across this on your screen:

1.The frothy -,Lueo'ieadfecal matter
tha j soreties
helty-rodvtof =nal sex.

Click to Contiue

Dan Savage had found a way to make sure that this website was always
one of the first to pop up in a Google search of the former Senator's name. Rick
Santorum objected strenuously and asked Google in September 2011 to have the
definition removed and the search result altered. But Google said that it does not
"remove content from our search results, except in very limited cases such as
illegal content and violations of our webmaster guidelines." 41
E. The Lack ofAny Solid Empirical Evidence ofHarm
None of this anecdotal evidence, of course, tells us anything about the
connection between possible polarization and incivility, or for that matter between
polarization and political violence. Regarding the first, the connection remains
tenuous. There is evidence, as Professors Massaro and Stryker suggest, that
"during the time period that polarization increased, uncivil discourse on the floor
of the House of Representatives likewise increased"; and the same is true for the
Senate.42 But the correlation has not yet been explained, leaving us with little
information about "whether polarization produces incivility, incivility produces
polarization, or-as it seems most likely-there is a reciprocal relationship
between the two." 43 Regarding the connection to political violence, there is even
less to go on. I have found one study offering some empirical evidence backing the
claim that political polarization is associated with increased risks of violence or

41.
Alexander Burns, Rick Santorum Contacted Google, Says Company Spreads
'Filth,' POLITICO (Sept. 20, 2011, 2:49 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/
63952.html
42.
Massaro & Stryker, supra note 27, at 413.
43.
Id.
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serious political turmoil.44 However, the research is not specific to the United
States, and is more focused on interstate conflicts and civil war.
Professors Massaro and Stryker address the related problem of political
fragmentation, balkanization, and echo-chambers, which might also exacerbate
polarization, incivility, and perhaps political violence. Although they do find
evidence that "people may be more motivated to seek out opinion-confirming
information than . .. information that challenges their opinion," 4 5 and although
they express concern that these balkanization and echo-chamber effects may have
negative effects (including nefarious consequences for political participation and
democratic engagement), they are clear that the mix of studies leaves the question
inconclusive at best.4 6 In the end, we are, again, left with little solid empirical data
to go on.
F. True Threats and the American Coalition of Life Activists
In this discussion, it is important to carve out a particular category of
political discourse that goes beyond traditional incivility and encompasses direct,
real threats to identifiable persons that are likely to trigger physical violence, harm,
and personal injury. Here, the causal relation is direct, and as a result, there are
separate bodies of jurisprudence to deal with these cases. There are criminal
statutes that prohibit intentionally threatening physical harm to individuals where
there is a real likelihood of harm, 47 and there are also categorical exceptions to
First Amendment free speech protections where true threats or fighting words are

44.
See Joan Esteban & Gerald Schneider, Polarization and Conflict:
Theoretical and EmpiricalIssues, 45 J. PEACE REs. 131, 131-41 (2008).
45.
Massaro & Stryker, supra note 27, at 419.

46.
Massaro and Stryker marshal a number of studies that both support and
undermine the hypotheses of fragmentation and echo-chambers See id. at 413-19. In the
first category, see especially Benjamin R. Warner, Segmenting the Electorate:The Effects of
Exposure to Political Extremism Online, 61 COMM. STUD. 430 (2010) (creating a 2010

cross-sectional study of a random sample of participants in neo-Nazi online discussion
groups that showed those who reported visiting the site more often also reported more
support for racial violence and for Hitler, holding constant their gender, education, age,
income, news media exposure, and more general online participation); in the second
category, see especially JOHN HORRIGAN ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE
AND
DEMOCRATIC
DEBATE
14-18
(2004),
available
at
http://www.pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2004/PIPPolitical_InfoReport.pdf.pdf
(finding significant heterogeneity of opinion among discussion groups organized around
political issues). They also point us to studies that are inconclusive regarding these
hypotheses. See R. Kelly Garrett, Echo Chambers Online?: Politically Motivated Selective
Exposure Among Internet News Users, 14 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 265, 269-70
(2009) (finding that people tend to select articles that reinforced their views, but they also
INTERNET

chose some articles that challenged their views; if they start to read something and found it
did challenge their views, they only infrequently stop reading for this reason); Tetsuro
Kobayashi & Ken'ichi Ikeda, Selective Exposure in Political Web Browsing: Empirical
Verification of 'Cyber-Balkanization' in Japan and the USA, 12 INFO. COMM. & Soc'Y 929,
949-50 (2009) (similar findings).
47.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 115, 248, 844, 871, 875, 876 (2012).
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at issue. The constitutional analysis tends to fall under the "true threats" doctrine
of Brandenburg v. Ohio,4 8 and the Supreme Court has delineated the scope of
49
protected threats in several other cases, notably Watts v. United StateS and
50
NAACP v. ClaiborneHardwareCo.
An illustration of true threats involves the targeting of abortion doctors
and the case brought on October 26, 1995, by four individual physicians and two
clinics against the American Coalition of Life Activists ("ACLA")." In that case,
the doctors claimed that the ACLA had engaged in a campaign of terror and
intimidation by targeting them with specific threats-including a "Deadly Dozen
List" poster. 52 The "Deadly Dozen List" was part of a series of "Wanted" posters
that identified 13 physicians by name, included some of their home addresses,
declared them guilty of crimes against humanity, and offered $5,000 for
information leading to their arrest, conviction, and revocation of their license to
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court
48.
established the test used to determine the constitutionality of a statute that criminalizes
violent incitement. Id. at 447-48. The Brandenburg case involved a Ku Klux Klan leader
who made a speech advocating violence against Blacks, Jews, and their supporters to a
group of armed hooded men. Id. at 444-47. He was convicted under an Ohio statute that
criminalized advocacy of violence as a means of accomplishing political reform. Id. at 44445. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction and the Ohio statute, stating that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. at 447.
394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam). In Watts, the Supreme Court ruled that
49.
hyperbole must be distinguished from true threats, overturning the conviction of an 18-yearold who had "threatened" the President by saying: "They always holler at us to get an
education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to
report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a
rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." Id. at 706. The Court suggested
several factors that should be considered when determining whether a statement is a true
threat, including: (1) whether or not the speech constitutes political hyperbole; (2) the
overall context in which the statement is made; (3) the reaction of the listeners; and (4)
whether or not the statement was conditional, especially if it was conditional on an event
that was unlikely to occur. Id. at 706-08.
458 U.S. 886 (1982). Clairborne Hardware involved a group of Black
50.
citizens who organized a boycott of White merchants. Id. at 888. A group of men called the
Black Hats recorded all Blacks who entered the stores. Id. at 903. These names were then
read aloud at meetings and published in a newspaper. Id. at 904. Approximately ten violent
acts were committed against violators of the boycott. Id. at 905. One of the issues for the
Court was whether a man who gave a speech at a meeting, threatening to break the necks of
anyone who violated the boycott, had made a criminal threat. Id. at 902, 906. The Court
unanimously said no, calling the speech a kind of political hyperbole protected under Watts.
Id. at 911.
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life
51.
Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Or. 1996), vacated, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
Id. at 1362.
52.
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practice medicine.53 The doctors also claimed ACLA maintained a set of
"Nuremberg Files"-a mix of hard files and a website that contained pictures,
addresses, and other information about abortion doctors.54 A number of doctors
identified in the Nuremberg Files were murdered or otherwise victimized, and the
website would strike their names off or gray out their names if they were murdered
or injured, respectively.55
After years of appeals, the Ninth Circuit en banc decided that the ACLA's
actions constituted "true threats of force" within the meaning of the Freedom of
Access to Clinics Entrances Act ("FACE") (18 U.S.C. § 248) and were therefore
not protected speech under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit held that:
"threat of force" in FACE means what our settled threats law says a
true threat is: a statement which, in the entire context and under all
the circumstances, a reasonable person would foresee would be
interpreted by those to whom the statement is communicated as a
serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm upon that person.
So defined, a threatening statement that violates FACE is
unprotected under the First Amendment.56
In so doing, the Court distinguished Brandenburg, Watts, and Claiborne by

pointing to the fact that the ACLA had individualized their message:
The "GUILTY" posters were publicly distributed, but
personally targeted. While a privately communicated threat is
generally more likely to be taken seriously than a diffuse public one,
this cannot be said of a threat that is made publicly but is about a
specifically identified doctor and is in the same format that had
previously resulted in the death of three doctors who had also been
publicly, yet specifically, targeted. There were no individualized
threats in Brandenburg, Watts or Claiborne. However, no one

putting Crist, Hem, and the Newhalls on a "wanted"-type poster, or
participating in selecting these particular abortion providers for such
a poster or publishing it, could possibly believe anything other than
that each would be seriously worried about bein next in line to be
shot and killed. And they were seriously worried.

53.

Id.

54.
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 1077.

57.

Id. at 1086.
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Despite this ruling, it is interesting to note that a Nuremberg Files
successor website still exists today and contains identical information. Here is the
page on their website:
ALLEGED ABORTIONISTS AND THEIR ACCOMPLICES
Tiller the Killer Aborted!

Aborted and Nearly Aborted Abortioists
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Due To The Recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
We Have Reverted To A Version Of The Nuremberg Files
Published Without The Strike Through Lines Defined By A
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Adevcssuhasrk
theexepio
list
aefudanteitta
orgftattiA
oundedwr
who
were kIlled
Court of Appeals
As A "True Threat".
Hysterical
Ninth Circuit
(Most weirdly, the Ninth Circuit found that it was only the use of
the strike through graphical device on the names of dead
abortionists that somehow made the Nuremberg Files a "true
threat." I temporarily removed that graphic device to conform to the
cloud coocoo land decrees of the Ninth Circuit.)
Since we were forced to remove the names of the abortionists
who were killed or wounded, we have found another list that
contains precisely the same information that we had published with
the exception that this list uses no graphic devices such as strike
through lines, etc. The form and most of the content of the list that
follows was obtainedftom a pro-abortion web site.5 9
58.
Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices, CHRISTIAN
http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/aborts.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
59.
Id.

GALLERY,
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Despite the continued existence of this website, and the legal wrangling
over the availability of the information, this is precisely the kind of political
discourse that goes beyond incivility and constitutes a direct threat of real harm to
individuals. This type of discourse evidently falls outside the scope of debates over
civility in politics and should be legally prohibited.
Naturally, this raises line-drawing questions, such as whether Sarah
Palin's crosshairs map on her Facebook page amounted to true threats or whether
the rhetoric of more revolutionary groups in this country presents a true threat of
violence.60 It is extremely unlikely that they would qualify as such under current
First Amendment doctrine. 6 ' However, drawing lines and defining terms can be an
exercise in politics, too. It is important to narrowly define the category of true
threats, but also not to allow such speech where the causal connection to political
violence can be established through court proceedings.

II. THE POLITICS OF INCIVILITY
It is curious, but not entirely surprising, that many of these illustrations of
purportedly uncivil discourse are associated with less mainstream positions (as in
60.

For instance, the Revolutionary Communist Party maintains that:
In order to bring this new socialist state into being, it would be
necessary to thoroughly defeat, dismantle and abolish the capitalistimperialist state of the USA; and this in turn would only become
possible with the development of a profound and acute crisis in society
and the emergence of a revolutionary people, in the millions and
millions, who have the leadership of a revolutionary communist
vanguard and are conscious of the need for revolutionary change and
determined to fight for it. To work for this objective-to hasten while
awaiting the emergence of these necessary conditions, with the goal of
revolution and ultimately communism clearly in mind-is the strategic
orientation of the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA.

at
i (2010), availableat http://revcom.us/socialistconstitution/SocialistConstitution-en.pdf
For a civilian, it is certainly legal to preach revolution. Today, the test used
61.
for assessing the legality calling for a revolution would be the Brandenburg test: (1)
advocating violence; (2) that is directed to incite imminent violence; and (3) is likely to
incite imminent violence. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). In
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 300-01 (1957), which was overruled by Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), a group of California Communists were arrested for
violating the Smith Act, which criminalized advocating the overthrow of the U.S.
government. The Supreme Court ruled that the Communists could not be convicted under
the Smith Act unless they made an overt act towards committing an illegal act (beyond
advocacy). Yates, 354 U.S. at 329-30. In this case, the Court was moving away from the
McCarthy Era and Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-10 (195 1), where the Court
ruled that the gravity of the evil of preaching communist revolution outweighed First
Amendment concerns. These things said, arguably the fear surrounding terrorism and some
Court decisions surrounding the Patriot Act have us sliding back toward the era of Dennis
and the Alien and Sedition Acts. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705
(2010); Adam Liptak, Court Affirms Ban on Aiding Groups Tied to Terror, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2010, at Al.
CONSTITUTION FOR THE NEW SOCIALIST REPUBLIC IN NORTH AMERICA (DRAFT PROPOSAL),
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the case of the Tea Party or Occupy Wall Street) or with the more strident or
extremist politicians, activists, and political parties (such as Sarah Palin, Rick
Santorum, Dan Savage, or the Revolutionary Communist Party). I say "not entirely
surprising" because, when one has a lot of political power or clout, one often does
not need to be uncivil. It is almost as if being uncivil correlates, somehow, with
being somewhat out of the mainstream.
The truth is, Dan Savage likely does not have the same ability to attract
media attention, barring his extreme discourse, as more established politicians or
commentators. Similarly, it is Rick Santorum's and Sarah Palin's extreme
discourse, in part, that turned them into media stars. As Stephen Carter suggests in
his book, Civility, part of the problem involves the structure of the market,
especially the news media and its focus on extreme talk. 62 The media tends to
pander to the lowest common denominator, which produces a race to the bottom.
What gets attention in the news cycle and talk shows tends to be the extreme and
uncivil. But the problem, ultimately, cannot be dissociated from the larger issues
of status and power. What would it mean, exactly, in terms of access to public
debate, air time, and political influence, to demand that Savage refrain? Putting
aside, for a moment, the question of who started it-what Professor Yoshino refers
to as the "tit-for-tat" problem64-the issue of civility is inextricably related to the
question of political power.
A. Privilege and the Definition of Incivility
The very definition of incivility-who gets to define it and how it gets
defined-is itself intimately connected to power. Today, much like in the
eighteenth century, what counts as civil discourse is politically loaded. The term
itself is remarkably malleable-inevitably so-and shaped by political forces. We
often think we know what is at the very core of the category, until we look more
closely.
In the analogous context of the broken-windows theory, we have seen that
the definition of incivilities is a political exercise. Typical examples of disorder
include prostitution and loitering. How they became synonymous with disorder,
though, is a reflection of dominant political views-and is often factually
incorrect. Commercial sex neighborhoods-what are often referred to as "red light
districts"-tend to be more orderly than expected, given that commercial sex
operations need to ensure that their customers not feel threatened.65 Similarly,
neighborhoods that are governed by organized crime often have reputations for
being safe neighborhoods. 66 And loitering-people hanging out at the corner-it

62.

STEPHEN L. CARTER, CIVILITY: MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF

DEMOCRACY 130 (1998).

63.

Id. at 129.

64.
65.
66.

Yoshino, supra note 39, at 472.
See HARCOURT, supra note 24, at 132-33.
Id.
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turns out, often is a form of social control and monitoring that ensures safety in a
tight-knit community.67
It is also true that perceptions of incivility are racially coded: How we
perceive disorder is the product of the racial composition of the neighborhood.
Black and Hispanic neighborhoods are perceived as far more disorderly than an
objective measurement would establish. Professors Robert Sampson and Stephen
Raudenbush, in a 2004 study, show that neighborhood racial composition affects
people's perceptions of neighborhood disorder. 69 Their study explores the grounds
on which individuals form perceptions of disorder and concludes that, although
observed disorder may predict perceived disorder to some degree, the racial and
economic context affects an individual's perceived disorder to a greater extent. 70 In
other words, people look at race, but see disorder.
This bias makes it difficult to define incivility in the broken-windows
context. In fact, it is practically impossible. Disorder is in the eye of the
beholder-it is, ironically, a normative category. Although it is used as a
descriptor, it functions as a normative statement. Here, perhaps, is the best
evidence: In New York City under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, crime rates fell
precipitously from 1994 to 1996.n The rate of robbery, for instance, fell
approximately 60%. During the same period, the allegations of police misconduct
by civilians increased by approximately 68%.72 Was this a period of order or a
period of disorder? How you answer that question, it turns out, says a lot more
about your politics than it does about any "neutral" definition of order.
In this sense, Professor Barak Orbach is entirely right. In his essay On
Hubris, Civility, and Incivility, he writes that the very definition of "civil" and

"uncivil" discourse is deeply ambiguous. Our cognitive frailties, as humans,
mean that we are extremely bad or uneven-in other words, biased-at identifying
incivility. Our heuristic imperfections, and worse, our blindness to our own
imperfections, get in the way. I would merely add that the problem is not only one
of cognitive bias, but is political in nature as well. Being able to call something
MARY PATTILLO, BLACK ON THE BLOCK: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CLASS IN
67.
THE CITY (2008).

See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder:
68.
NeighborhoodStigma and the Social Construction of 'Broken Windows,' 67 SOc. PSYCHOL.
Q. 319 (2004); Danielle Wallace, A Test of the Routine Activities and Neighborhood
Attachment Explanations for Bias in Disorder Perceptions, 58 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
(forthcoming 2012). See generally Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime,
and Visual Processing,87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004).
Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 68, at 337.
69.
70.
Id.
Clifford Krauss, New York Crime Rate Plummets to Levels Not Seen in 30
71.
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1996, at Al.
72.
HARCOURT, supra note 24, at 167-68. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt,
PolicingDisorder: Can We Reduce Serious Crime by PunishingPetty Offenses?, Bos. REV.,
Apr.-May 2002, at 16.
Barak Orbach, On Hubris, Civility, and Incivility, 54 ARIZ. L. REv. 443, 44473.
45(2012).
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"uncivil," ironically, is not that different from what Margaret Radin refers to as
rhetorical capture. 74 It is not that different than her example of the term "cyber
squatter." It raises a similar "baseline problem." 75 It is all about labeling, about
attaching labels to things, and in the process gaining the upper hand.
B. Questioningthe Consensus on Incivility
In their brilliant article, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy, and
Emerging Evidence on Civility and Effective Democratic Engagement, Professors
Toni Massaro and Robin Stryker emphasize that reliable polling research finds

significant overlap on what amounts to incivility. 76 "Contrary to what many
assume," they write, "there is fairly substantial consensus, both among citizens,
and between citizens and behavioral researchers, about what is more or less civil or
uncivil in politics, and the core of what counts as political incivility."77 And I have
no doubt, for instance, that many Americans would find Dan Savage's web attack
of Rick Santorum to be uncivil. If ever there were a case of "I know it when I see
it," Savage's definition of Santorum would seem to qualify. Most of us would
agree it is a case of political incivility-regardless of who started it-even if some
also find it humorous.

But even here, it is important to dig deeper and to question whether part
of the label of "uncivil" in this very case has something to do with the fact that it
alludes to male homosexual intercourse. Would we all feel the same way if it
alluded to heterosexual intercourse, not in a way that targeted women, but instead
displayed the prowess of a heterosexual man? What happens when we shift places
within existing relations of power? What if the web attack had defined the word
"Santorum" as "being a stud"? That term also has a sexual connotation. It means,
as we all know well, a "man of (reputedly) great sexual potency or
accomplishments." 7 8 Could it be that we would have found that less offensiveand might that be because it refers to a more mainstream sexual type or fantasy?
Body fluids, it is true, tend to be "disgusting" and a source of insult. But even
there, the disgusting nature of bodily fluids has often been used, specifically, as a
way to impugn homosexuality. 79 What is the role of sexual hierarchies in our
imaginations of civility-or in labeling and defining discourse as uncivil?
Insults and offense are intimately connected to social rank, as Norbert
Elias emphasized in The Civilizing Process. Elias's insightful discussion of
pictorial representation in the drawings and paintings of the late-Medieval upper
74.
75.
76.
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class serves as an illustration. The inclusion of images of paupers begging, or lame
peasants, or of toiling servants in the artworks were not, at the time, viewed as a
political statement and did not give offense-as they would later. "They [were] not
emphasized in a spirit of protest, in the manner of later times," Elias would
emphasize.8 0 Rather, in the Middle Ages, it was "an inseparable part of the
existence of the rich and noble that there also exist peasants and craftsmen
working for them, and beggars and cripples with open hands."81 These depictions
did not present a threat to the noble, nor any offense or painful feelings. In fact,
often enough, Elias added, "the yokel and peasant are even the objects of
pleasantries." 82 The presence of these now-disturbing figures were not viewed as
offensive or uncivil. "It is not distasteful, it is part of the natural and unquestioned
order of the world that warriors and nobles have leisure to amuse themselves,
while the others work for them."83
The changing norms of offense and manners would allow someone like
the Flemish painter Breughel "to bring cripples, peasants, gallows, or people
relieving themselves into his pictures." 84 The idea of portraying someone urinating
may strike people, at a different time, as inappropriate or offensive, but that only
reflects how shifting relations of class and power inflect our norms of manners. As
Elias wrote, "The feelings of the medieval upper class [did] not yet demand that
everything vulgar should be suppressed from life and therefore from pictures. It is
gratifying for the nobles to know themselves different from others. The sight of
contrast heightensjoy in living. . . .,85

There is a political dimension to defining what is vulgar and unseemly.
This remains true today. In a similar way, New York City's quality-of-life
initiative, which targeted incivilities such as public urination, was inflected with
relations of social rank, wealth, and cosmopolitanism-and not surprisingly, was
influenced by real estate interests.8 6 Much of the redefinition of civility and
incivility in New York from the 1970s to the 1990s, and also in other large
metropolises such as Los Angeles and Chicago, revolved around the interests of
real estate developers and property owners.8 7 The commercial development of
New York's Times Square, the trendy loft developments in Downtown Los
Angeles's Skid Row, and the bulldozing of Chicago's Near-West Side Skid Row
were not the product of heightened sensitivity to urban incivilities, but of material,
commercial, and financial interests-mixed with lots of city politics. The truth is
that civility and its enforcement are not so much matters of universal or
80.
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unchanging norms, or of neutral principles, but more often are tied to material
interests.
There is also a political dimension to what we might call "acceptable
uncivil discourse." There is, in effect, a shifting "Overton Window" of incivility:
Uncivil discourse may represent the extreme, but what represents "mainstream
incivility" changes over time. Professors Massaro and Stryker offer several
examples of historical uncivil rhetoric that show well that what society deems
"acceptable" uncivil speech shifts over time. For' example, they write,
"Newspapers that opposed the policies of Abraham Lincoln carried political
cartoons that depicted white men dancing with African-American women, and
captioned 'The Miscegenation Ball'-patent efforts to mobilize racist anxieties
about interracial relations to promote anti-Republican sympathies." 89 Similar racial
attacks would not be acceptable today even in mainstream uncivil debates.
At the same time, socio-linguistic research has revealed variances in the
way in which we hear discourse. These differences often emerge along gender,
racial, and ethnic lines parallel to those delineating social power. Women, for
instance, are more likely to be heard to adopt indirect and deferential speech
patterns, which can impact their communicative relationships-especially in the
civic realm. 90 This difference, which has often been referred to as a "female
register," constitutes a gendered mode of speech identified by its syntactic and
paralinguistic features, and has been shown to reinforce in certain ways the
subordinated role of women in society.91 These linguistic differences also appear
along racial and class lines. 92 If indeed one's mode of speech-or the way in which
one is heard-affords more or less social communicative power, and if those
differences are tied to gender or race, then surely we should proceed with caution
regarding the very concept and definition of incivility.
While there are, to be sure, certain extreme forms of insult that most of us
would agree count as political incivility, they themselves are often laced with
troubling dimensions of social hierarchy and relations of power. They are also,
most often, outnumbered by the borderline cases of sharp speech where the charge
of incivility is politicized and may mask biases and prejudices. The existence of a
few easy cases of incivility should not obfuscate the complex politics of incivility.
89.
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C. The Political Dimensions of Civil Discourse
The call for civil discourse privileges a certain political position-a more
centrist, dominant, reasonable, accommodating, and mainstream political position
that can more easily afford to pooh-pooh political conflict. It manages to avoid
uncivil discourse precisely because of its privilege in the political sphere. The call
for civility is often couched as politically neutral; but it is not. It aligns with a
dominant, centrist, status quo approach. Let me explain.
There have been, throughout history, calls for radical political change and
sometimes political violence-in other words, for incivility-at all ends of the
political spectrum, since the American and French Revolutions, to the Bolshevik
and later, the Russian Revolution, all the way to the Arab Spring. Sometimes these
have involved political actions that practically all of us would endorse and
embrace. The Egyptian people, for instance, overthrew their despotic leader,
President Hosni Mubarak. There is no doubt that this act was "uncivil"-it
involved a popular uprising and a quasi-coup d'tat by the military. And yet a
majority of Americans supported the revolution in Egypt and elsewhere.93
Similarly, both the Revolutionary Communist Party and the Tea Party in the
United States believe that we need revolutionary change. That too is uncivil. Some
political positions, it turns out, do not promote the status quo. They call for radical
reform, if not revolution-changes that necessarily involve "uncivil" harm to the
interests of certain fellow citizens.
But it is not only revolutionary or radical politics that are uncivil. Even
mainstream politics tends to be uncivil, in the sense that it will have harmful
effects on some citizens. Even mainstream politicians-the Republicans and the
Democrats-are consistently advocating positions that will harm certain
Americans, whether at the top or at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy.
Taxing the wealthy more (or not) will harm (or benefit) the financial position and
welfare of different classes of Americans. There is no way around this. Providing
universal healthcare (or not) will also benefit (or harm) different groups of
Americans. Politics, it turns out, is an uncivil business.
If this is indeed true, is it not somewhat hypocritical to demand "civil"
discourse? Isn't it like asking the executioner to smile when he pushes the syringe,
or the police officer to say please when she puts on the hand-cuffs? Why demand
civility in discourse when the discourse itself is inevitably going to produce uncivil
outcomes? In his essay praising the virtues of legal decisionmaking as a model for
civil discourse, Professor Yoshino argues that courtroom trials avoid the harms of
incivility by allowing adverse parties to speak through professionals who are
socialized into civility and taught to speak not at each other, but to a neutral party
(the judge or jury).94 In doing so, trials encourage a discourse that is less political
without sacrificing rigor or barring authentic treatment of the issues. But isn't it
93.
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odd that the "civil" trial method is precisely what legitimizes and performs, as a
speech act, the execution of a convicted capital defendant, the life imprisonment of
a felon, the foreclosure of your home, the taking of your property, or even worse,
the removal of your children? The method is civil in form only. The outcomes are
decidedly not. And which matters more? Ironically, the more uncivil the act-for
instance, lethally injecting a human being-the more civility we demand in the
process. Uncivil, ad hominem debates over the death penalty never lead to a legal
execution; only a civil method can achieve that ultimate punishment.
D. Personal Choices About Political Civility
As a personal matter, I tend to avoid being uncivil, in large part, I suspect,
because of the way I was brought up-but also, perhaps, because of my own
privileged professional, social, and importantly, demographic status. Somewhat
like Stephen Carter, I too was taught manners and disciplined strictly at school and
at home (though unlike Carter, I was never quizzed on whether knife blades should
point in or out; for some reason, my son and daughter seem to know).95 That has
long-lasting effects-effects that have gone hand-in-hand with certain kinds of
privileges in education and profession. These have instilled in me-and have
allowed me to be able to afford-an ethic of truth-telling and civility.
Still today, I tend to believe that the strongest and more forceful way for
me to engage others in politics and in life is to be truthful and sincere. I am drawn
to an ethic of honesty and truth-telling, and believe in its power of persuasion. In
my political discourse, I strive to talk genuinely and earnestly, and to avoid, as
much as possible, the tit-for-tat strategy-though sadly I fall short on occasion. I
believe there is an important role for truth-telling as a mode of self-governance,
both for oneself but also as a political matter. 96 But I also realize these are political
choices. They represent political strategies.
Avoiding incivility, taking the higher road, turning the other cheekthese acts are embedded in relations of power and simultaneously are constitutive
of power relations. The interlocutor who stands untouched by acerbic and uncivil
discourse emerges stronger. Nietzsche captured this perhaps best in a passage that
I so often find myself coming back to. It is from his more aphoristic writings in the
Genealogy of Morals, and it concerns punishment. Nietzsche writes:
As its power increases, a community ceases to take the
individual's transgressions so seriously, because they can no longer
be considered as dangerous and destructive to the whole as they
were formerly: the malefactor is no longer "set beyond the pale of
95.
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peace" and thrust out; universal anger may not be vented upon him
as unrestrained as before . . . . It is not unthinkable that a society

might attain such a consciousness of power that it could allow itself
the noblest luxury possible to it-letting those who harm it go
unpunished. "What are my parasites to me?" it might say. "May
they live and prosper: I am strong enough for that!""
In the end, the choice to be civil is a political decision in a world in which
politics is, most often, uncivil. Despite that, I do not believe that we face a crisis of
incivility in our political discourse today, nor do I fear that we will descend into a
hellish excess of incivility. I have a sense-unfounded perhaps, and naive as
well-that positive, civil, truthful, and genuine discourse tends to prevail, or at the
very least, to counter the power of incivility. And I know that the call for civility
comes more easily for some than for others. For these reasons, I resist the
temptation to urge more civil discourse.
CONCLUSION
In his elegant essay, The 'Civil' Courts: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage,

Professor Kenji Yoshino discusses three types of arguments against the project of
civilizing political discourse.98 The first is that embracing civility in political
99
discourse will rhetorically disadvantage the civil speaker. The second is that
civility honors the dishonorable, or, in the words of Gertrude Himmelfarb, it
honors "despicable people." 00 The third is that civility in the face of insults bars
authentic engagement. 01 The idea, as Randall Kennedy suggests, is that
demanding civility is at odds with what true liberalism calls for: to debate ideas
loudly.102
I am not persuaded by any of these three arguments, and yet I both resist
the call for civility and personally embrace a civil touch. I firmly believe, like
Nietzsche, that civility is a sign of strength, not weakness. I doubt that it honors
one's adversary; to the contrary, and somewhat unfortunately, it demeans them by
exposing their antics. And I am skeptical that civility in the face of incivility does
not allow for a full, robust debate. My position, in the end, is somewhat different.
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It is that civility is a personal preference and a political strategy-a powerful
political strategy in a political realm that is inherently uncivil.
On April 13, 1956, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., stood in the pulpit
of Rockefeller Memorial Chapel at the University of Chicago and declared:
We cannot slow up, because we have a date with destiny and
we must move with all deliberate speed . . . . This is a conflict

between the forces of light and dark, and in the end there will be
victory for justice and democracy because love will triumph.. . . If
you can't run, walk; if you can't walk, crawl, but keep moving
forwardo103
Many accused Martin Luther King of fomenting social disorder with this language
of conflict, light and dark, victory, and triumph. Many accused him of being
uncivil. And of course, things were even worse for Malcolm X with his notorious
appeal to "all necessary means."l 04
Theirs were, I would say, marginalized voices in the larger fabric of
political power in this country at that time. It would have been too easy, I think, to
ask for more civil discourse. It would have assumed too much of a position of
political power. It would have been too comfortable-perhaps not sufficiently
respectful. As Antoine de Courtin explained in his treatise over 300 years ago,
civility has its roots in modesty, humility, and respect-in his words, in "a modest
sentiment about ourselves toward others who we believe worthy of our submission
and our love." 05
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